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REPORTS OF CASES 
DETERlIIINED IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF CALI FORNIA 
[40 C.2d 33; 250 P.2d 593] 
[Sac. No. 6166. In Bank. Dec. 2, 1952.] 
Estute of GERASIMOS CARA ¥AS, Deceased. SHELDON 
BRANDENBURGER, as Administrator, etc., Appellant, 
v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. 
[1] Alienage-Inheritance-Rights of Nonresident Alien.-When 
a nonresident alien succeeds to property, title vests in him 
at the death of decedent, subject to control of the probate 
"court and to possession of the personal representative for 
purposes of administration. (Prob. Code, § 300.) 
[2] Id. - Inheritance - Time Within Which Property Must be 
Claimed.-If a nonresident alien should appear and demand 
property within five years of his succession thereto, his right 
to the property is absolute; if he fails to meet that require-
ment, his right to the property is disposed of as escheated 
property. (Prob. Code, § 1026.) 
[3] Decedents' Estates-Decree of Distribution-Distribution to 
State.-Under Probe Code, § 1027, estate assets not distributed 
by the final decree to known heirs, devisees or legatees entitled 
thereto, are distributed to the state and are held by the State 
Treasurer. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Alienage and Citizenship, § 15; Am.Jur.,~" 
Aliens, § 42 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] "Alienage, § 28; [2, 14] Alienage, 
§ 33; [3] Decedents' Estates, § 1042.5; [4] Alienage, § 34; [5-7, 
11, 12, 15] Escheat, § 7; [8] War, § 8; [9, 10] Liniitation of Ac-
tions, §§ 109, 113; [13] Limitation of Actions, § 113; [16] Limita-
tion of Actions, § 116.5. 
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Alienage-Inheritance-Effect of Failure to Olaim Property. 
--If an alien succeeding to property has not made a "de-
Ilumd" therefor under Proh. Code, § 1026, .at the time of the 
decree of distribution, the Stute Treasurer takes possession 
of the property. 
[5] Escheat-Claims to Escheated Property.-When property is 
held by the State Treasurer under Prob. Code, § 1027, claim-
ants must appear and claim the estate or any part thereof 
in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, and if the 
claim is not filed within the statutory period it "shall be 
forever barred," and such property shall vest absolutely in 
the state. 
[6] Id.-Claims to Escheated Property-Time to File Claim.-
, Since the sentence of Prob. Code, § 1027, preceding the state-
ment that "Rights of nonresident aliens shall be governed 
by the provisions of Section 1026," provides that the five-year 
period for filing a claim under § 1027 commences from the 
date of the decree making distribution to the State Treasurer, 
the purpose of the reference to § 1026 is to call attention 
to the fact that when nonresident aliens succeed to the 
property, the five-year period is computed from the "time 
of succesHion" rather than from the date of distribution. 
[7] Id. - Claims to Escheated Property. - When Prob. Code, 
§§ 1026, 1027, are read together, it is clear that after the 
State Treasurer takes possession of assets of an estate pur-
suant to § 1027, a "demand" by a nonresident alien under 
§ 1026 must be made in the Superior Court of Sacramento 
County in the same manner that a "claim" would be made 
for other assets held by the State Treasurer under § 1027, 
the only difference between the two classes of property being 
that in the case of a nonresident alien the five-year period 
for making the claim is computed in a different manner. 
[8] War-Alien Enemies-Maintaining Actions.-A citizen and 
resident of Greece during the period when the United States 
was at war with Germany came within Trading With the 
Enemy Act as a resident of an enemy-occupied country (50 
U.S.C. Appendix, § 2), and hence was unable to maintain 
a proceeding in a California court for the recovery of her 
property to which she was entitled as an heir. 
[8] Right of resident alien who is a subject of an enemy coun-
try to prosecute suit during war, notes, 3 A.L.R. 341; 140 A.L.R. 
1518; 141 A.L.R. 1512; 142 A.L.R. 1505; 143 A.L.R. 1517; 144 
A.L.R. 1507; 145 A.L.R. 1471; 146 A.L.R. 1470; 147 A.L.R. 1303; 
148 A.L.R. 1384; 149 A.L.R. 1453; 150 A.L.R. 1418. See, also, 
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[9] Limitation of Actions-Suspension of Statute-War-Stat-
utory Prohibition.-A "disability" under Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 354, excluding from period limited for commencement of 
an action the time during which a person is under a disa-
bility to commence an action by reason of existence of a 
state of war, and a "statutory prohibition" under Code Civ. 
Proc., § 356, excluding from period limited for commence-
ment of an action the time when commencement of action 
is stayed by statutory prohibition, are present when Trad-
ing With the Enemy Act prevented administrator of estate 
of nonresident enemy alien from filing a claim to property 
in California. 
[10] Id.-Suspension of Statute-War-Statutory Prohibition.-
The word "action" in Code Civ. Pro c., §§ 354, 356, exclud-
ing from period limited for commencement of an action the 
time during which commencement of action is prevented by 
existence of a state of war or is stayed by a statutory prohibi-
tion, includes a "special proceeding of a civil nature." (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 363.) • 
[11] Escheat-Claims to Escheated Property-Procedure Appli-
cable.-When a claim to an estate distributed to the State 
Treasurer is filed in the Superior Court of Sacramento County 
pursuant to Prob. Code, §§ 1026, 1027, the applicable pro-
cedure is that outlined in Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1272, 1272a, 
relating to claims to escheated property, which are in part 
IIlof the Code of Civil Procedure, entitled "Special Proceed-
ings of a Civil Nature." 
[12] Id.-Claims to Escheated Property-Statute of Limitations. 
-The act of filing a claim in the Superior Court of Sacra-
mento County under Prob. Code, §§1026, 1027, to an estate 
distributed to the State Treasurer is the "commencement of 
an action" within Code Civ. Pro c., §§ 354, 356, excluding 
from period limited for commencement of an action the time 
during which commencement of action is prevented by exist-
ence of a state of war or is stayed by a statutory prohibition. 
[13] Limitation of Actions - Suspension of Statute - War. - A 
statute of limitation is tolled during the period when the 
existence of a state of war prevents access to the courts, 
[13] War suspending running of limitations in absence of . 
specific statutory provision to that effect, notes, 137 A.L.R. 1454; 
140 A.L.R. 1517; 141 A.L.R. 1511; 142 A.L.R. 150R; 143 A.L.R. 
1519; 144 A.L.R. 1508; 145 A.L.R. 1473; 146 A.L.R. 1472; 147 
A.L.R. 1311; 148 A.L.R. 1386; 149 A.L.R. 1457; 150 A.L.R. 1419, 
See, also, Oal.Jur., Limitations of Actions, § 160; Am.Jur., Limita-
tion of Actions, § 2~3 et seq. 
I====~-
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whether or not the particular statute of limitation expressly 
provides for such suspension thereof. 
[14] Alienage-Inheritance-Time Within Which Property Must 
be Claimed.-At least after a decree distributing an estate 
to the state has been entered under Prob. Code, § 1027, the 
right of a nonresident alien claiming the estate by succession 
is dependent on commencement of a legal proceeding within 
the five-year statutory period. ' 
[15] Escheat-Claims to Escheated Property-Statute of Limita-
tions.-In proceeding by administrator of estate of nonresi-
dent alien heir to recover property distributed to the state 
pursuant to Prob. Code, § 1027, it is error to include the 
period between the date of distribution to the state and the 
date of termination of German occupation of Greece, in which 
country the heir lived and died, in computation of the five-
year period specified in Prob. Code, § 1026. 
[16] Limitation of Actions - Suspension of Statute - Effect. -
When the operation of a statute of limitation is suspended 
for a given length of time, the effect is to add an equal period 
to the statutory period. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sac-
ramento County denying petition of administrator of estate 
of nonresident alien heir to recover property distributed to 
State Treasurer pursuant to Prob. Code, § 1027. John Quincy 
Brown, Judge. Reversed. 
Brandenburger & White and William A. White for Ap-
pellant. 
Harold I. Baynton, Assistant Attorney General, }i'rank J. 
Hennessy, United States Attorney, George B. Searls and 
Joseph Laufer, Attorneys, Department of Justice and Myron 
D. Alexander, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and 'Villiam J. 
Power, Dt'pnty Attorney Gt'Heral, for Respondent. 
'l'IL\ YNOH, .J.-Gerasimos Caravas died intestate in San 
Francisco Oil September ao, 1~)41, and his estate was probated 
in the Supel'ior (101I1·t of the City and County of San Fran-
eisco. No IIt'it·s appear('d to dailll tht' ('state and on September 
1;', 1~42, the court eutered its <it'cree ordering distribution 
of the estate to the State 1'reasurer pursuant to section 1027 
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viwd by his motlier, }<'oteini CarHVH:-i, H resident Hnd eitizf'll 
of Greeee Hnd his solp hpir llnder sedion 22!1 of OlP Probatp 
Code. Poteiui dipd ill UI'('PI'P ill 1944. On Allg-m;t 25, ]!)47, 
petitioner, administrator of Foteilli '8 estate, filed a petition 
in the Superior Court of Saeralllento County praying that 
the State 'freasurer be ordered to pay to petitioner the funds 
of the estate, amounting to $1,936.18. In explanation of the de-
lay ill filing the claim petitioner alleged, and the trial court 
found, that Greece was occupied by German military forces 
from April 7, 1941, to November 30, 1944, and that during 
this period it was impossible to file a claim for the funds held 
by the State Treasurer. The trial court also found that the 
reciprocity necessary under section 259 of the Probate Code 
existed. 'fhe court, however, entered judgment denying the 
claim, on the ground that it was barred by section 1026 of 
the Probate Code, providing: "A nonresident alien who be-
comes entitled to property by succession must appear and de-
mand the property within five years from the time of succes-
sion; otherwise, his rights are barred and the property shall 
be disposed of as escheated property." Petitioner appeals 
from the judgment, contending that his claim was timely 
made on the ground that the period of German occupation 
of Greece should not have been included in the computation 
of the five-year period prescribed by section 1026. 
[1] 'Vhen a nonresident alien succeeds to property, title· 
vests in him at the death of the decedent (Estate of Romat'is, 
191 Cal. 740, 744 [218 P. 421]), subject to the control of the 
probate court and to the possession of the personal represen-
tative for purposes of administration. (Prob. Code, § 300.) 
[2] If the nonresident alien should "appear and demand" 
the property within five years of his succession thereto, his 
right to the property is absolute; if he fails to meet that re-
quirement, his right to the property is barred and the prop-
erty is disposed of as escheated property. (Lyons v. State, 
67 Cal. 380, 384 [7 P. 763] ; Estate of Meyer, 107 Cal.App.2d 
799, 804 [238 P.2d 597].) Section 1026 does not expressly 
provide how the alien must make his "demand," but the 
applicable procedure is found in other statutes. [3] Under 
section 1027 of the Probate Code, estate assets not distributed 
by the final decree to known heirs, devisees, or legatees entitled 
thereto, are distributed to the State of California and are 
held by the State Treasurer. [4] Thus, if as in the present 
case an alien has not made a "demand" under section 1026 at 




38 E:-;'l'A'J'E 01~ CARAV AS [40 C.2d 
takt's poss('ssioll o/" til(' P1'oIH'rt.\'. [5] \Vhen property is held 
undpl' s!'diqll 1O~7, elailltallts mllst appeal' and claim the estate 
01' any part thereof jilt hl' Superior Court of Sacramento 
COllnty, If the (')aim j:s Jlot filed within the statutory period, 
jt "shall be forever barred, and such property, or so much 
thereof as is not claimed shall vest absolutely in the State." 
Section 1027 further provides that "Hights of nonresident 
aliens shall be governed by the provisions of Section 1026." 
[6] Since the sentence of section 1027 preceding the quoted 
reference to :section 1026, provides that the five-year period 
under section 1027 commences from the date of the decree 
making distribution to the State Treasurer, the purpose of 
the reference to section 1026 is to call attention to the fact 
that when nonresident aliens succeed to the property, the 
five-year period is computed froUl the "time of succession" 
rather than from the date of distribution. [7] When sec-
tions 1026 and 1027 are read together, it is clear that after 
the State 'l'reasurer takes possession of assets of an estate pur-
suant to section 1027, a "demand" by a nonresident alien 
under section 1026 must be made in the Superior Court of 
Sacramento County in the same manner that a "claim" would 
be made for other assets held by the State Treasurer under 
:section 1027, and that, after the distribution to the State 
'rreasurer, the only difference between the two classes of prop-
erty is that in the case of a nonresident alien the five-year 
period for making the claim is computed in a different man-
ner. 'l'he attorney general contends that a "demand" under 
section 1026 may be made without any court action by the 
nonresident alien, even after the property has been distributed 
to the State 'l'reasurer', relying upon a dictum in State v. 
Smith, 70 Cal. 153, 156 [12 P. 121]. In that case, however, 
the court was not concerned with express statutory language 
that after distribution to the State Treasurer a claim to the 
property could be made only in the Superior Court of Sacra-
llIento County. 
The determinative question on this appeal is whether the 
five-year period set forth in section 1026 should be extended 
bpcanse of the disability suffered by petitioner, 
[8] In the prc:sent case the nonresident alien was a citizen 
and resilIent of Greece during the period when the United 
States was at war with Germany. As a resident of an enemy-
occupied country she came within the provisions of section 
two of the Trading 'Vith the Enemy Act. (50 U.S.C.A. 
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N.Y.S.2d 74, 78], affirmed without opinion, 291 N.Y. 779 
[53 N.E.2d 243] ; The Rita Maersk, 52 F.Supp. 56, 59, affirmed, 
]44 F.2d 921; Compagnie Francaise De L'Afrique Occidentale 
v. The Otko, 57 F.Supp. 829; 148 A.L.R. 1423.) She was thus 
unable to maintain a proceeding in a California court for 
the recovery of her property. (Trading With the Enemy Act, 
§ 7; E.r parte Colonna, 314 U.S. 510, 511 [62 8.Ct. 373, 86 
L.Ed. 379] j Mder v. Schml:dt, 150 Neb. 647, 648 [35 N.W.2d 
500] ; 137 A.L.R. 1355.) Moreover, section 3 of the Trading 
With the Enemy Act prohibited residents of Greece from 
communicating with anyone in this country "except in the 
regular course of the mail " and during the German occupation 
mail service with Greece was suspended. (Postal Bulletin 
No. 18344, Nov. 28, 1941; Postal Bulletin No. 18773, Nov. 21, 
1944.) It thus was impossible for Foteini Caravas or her heirs 
in Greece to communicate with persons in this country, or to 
file an action in a California court if communication could be 
had. 
Petitioner contends that proceedings under sections 1026 
and 1027 are subject to sections 3541 and 3562 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure. This contention must be sustained. 
[9] A" disability" under section 354 and a "statutory pro-
hibition" under section 356 are both present since the Trad-
ing With the Enemy Act prevented petitioner from filing a 
claim to the property. [10] The word" action" in sections 
354 and 356 includes a "special proceeding of a civil nature." 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 363.) [11] 'Vhen a claim is filed in 
the Superior Court of Sacramento County pursuant to sec-
tions 1026 and 1027, the applicable procedure is that outlined 
in section 1272 and 1272a of the Code of Civil Procedure 
(Ebert v. State, 33 Ca1.2d 502, 509 [202 P.2d 1022]; see 
amendment to § 1027 by Stats. 1951, ch. 1459, § 1), and those 
sections are in part III of the Code of Civil Procedure, en-
titled "Special Proceeding'S of a Civil Nature." [12] It is 
thus clear that the act of filing a claim in the Superior Court 
of Sacramento County under sections 1026 and' 1027 is the 
l"When a person is, by reason of the existence of a state of war; 
under a disability to commence an action, the time of the continuance 
of such disability is not part of the period limited for the commence-
ment of the action whether such cause of action shall have accrued 
prior to or during the period of such disability." 
·"When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or 
statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of the injunction 
or prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement 
of the action." 
) 
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"eommencement of an action" within sections 354 and 356. 
(Taketa v. State Board of Equalization, 104 Cal.App.2d 455, 
459 [231 P.2d 873] [mandate to set aside order revoking 
liquor license] ; People v. Grant, 52 Cal.App.2d 794, 800 [127 
P.2d 19] [proceeding under Pen. Code, § 325 to forfeit money 
taken from slot machines] ; lVells v. California Tomato Juice, 
Inc., 47 Cal.App.2d 634, 6:17 [118 P.2d 916] [proceeding to 
(·nforc·e mechanic's lien].) 
[13] Moreover, although sections 1026, 1027, 1272 and 
1272a <10 not expressly refer to snspension of the limitation 
prriod when war has prevented access to the Superior Court 
of Sacramento County to file a claim, it is an established 
pJ'illeiple of international and municipal law that a statute 
of limitation is tolled during the period when the existence 
of a state of war prevents access to the courts, whether or not 
the particular statute of limitation expressly provides for 
sueh suspension thereof. (Kolund.iija v. Hanna Ore Mining 
Co., 155 Minn. 176, 179 [193 N.W. 163]; Wirtele v. Grand 
Lodge, A.O.U. W., 111 Neb. 302, 305 f196 N.W. 510] ; Siplyak 
v. Davis, 276 Pa. 49, 52 [119 A. 7451 ; Inland Steel Co. v. 
Jelenovic, 84 Ind.App. 373, 376 [150 N.E. 391] ; 54 C.J.S., 
IJimitation of Actions, § 259; 137 A.L.R. 1454.) "All stat-
utes of limitation are based on the assumption that one 
with a good cause of action will not delay bringing it for 
an unreasonable length of time; but, when a plaintiff has been 
denied access to the courts, the basis of the assumption be-
comes destroyed." (Frabutt v. New York, Chicago &- St. Louis 
R. Co., 84 F.Supp. 460, 466.) A typical case is Hanger v. 
Abbott, 6 'Vall. (U.S.) fi!32 [18 L.Ed. 939}. There, shortly 
after the CiviJ 'Var a resident of New Hampshire brought 
an action in the federal court in Arkansas against a resident 
of Arkansas. The debt sued upon had been contracted before 
fhp. war and the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations. 
Thp. COllrt held that since the COUl'ts of Arkansas were closed 
to a citizen of New Hampshire during the war, the statute 
of limitation was suspended for that period. The court 
l't'l'ol!ui1.<'ll that the applieable statute of limitation did not 
I'xprt'ssly rl,fl'r to war disabilities but held that nevertheles.~ 
it must be interpreted to include such exception. Again. in 
Pdt'I'''' \'. J/dl/l.'l, 19;; Ot·t'. -tl:! 1:!:IH P.2tl 22;;, :!4H P.2d 58fiL 
a l~aSt' appusitt, to tlit' pt'l'Sl'lIt Ullt', Ull Orel!on statute provided 
that aftt'l' property escht.'ated to the state, it could be claimed 
within 10 years thereof. rrhe statute did not provide for ex-
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Hrsidents of The Netherlands filed a claim after expiration 
of tlw statutory period, alleging- as an eXCIlS(l for the delay 
that the occnpation of rrh(l Netherlanos by (iermany prr-
venteo timcly compliancf' with the st.atute. The claimants' 
right was ultimately o(lnied on grounds inapplicable here, but 
the Oregon court held that the period during which the claim-
ants were denied access to the Oregon courts by reason of the 
war could not be included in the computation of the 10-year 
period. The court stated: "vVhen the state consents to be 
SHed, and then by reason of its recognition of rules of inter-
Ilatiollal and common law, closes its courts to the litigant, 
thereby Jellying the privilege which is granted, some construc-
tion must be sought which will avoid absurdity. It is unbe-
lievable that the same hand which gives should also be con-
st.rued to take away." (238 P.2d at 236.) 
The attorney general contends that the foregoing cases 
should not be followed here, on the ground that section 1026 
is a substantive statute of limitation and that at the expira-
tion of five years the nonresident alien not only lost his remedy 
under sections 1272 and 1272a, but that in addition the right 
itself was extinguished under section 1026. As previously 
pointed out, under section 1026 title vests in a nonresident 
alien at the death of the decedent, subject to the condition that 
he must" appear and demand" the property within five years 
to prevent loss of his title. If he does not so appear his right 
to the property is lost; if he does appear his right is pre-
served. [14] Thus, at least after a decree of distribution 
to the state has been entered under section 1027, the right of 
a nonresident alien is dependent upon the commencement of 
a legal proceeding within the five-year period, just as the re-
('overy of an ordinary party plaintiff may be dependent upon 
the commencement of appropriate legal proceedings within 
t he time specified by a statute of limitation. A contention 
similar to that made here by the attorney general was re-
jected in State of Maryland v. United States, 165 F.2d 869, 
873, where the court stated: "And we think that it makes no 
difference that the limitation applicable to the action for 
death by wrongful act is held under state law to be a con- . 
Jition on the exercise of the right rather than a limitation on 
the remedy. This holding is based upon the narrow ground 
that the limitation-is imposed by the statute creating the cause 
of action and is, to say the best of it, technical and legalistic 
reasoning, which is not followed in all the states." The same 
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~d 767, 769, whpre a merchant seaman was unable to file an 
action within the time specified by a substantive statute of 
limitation because he was interned by th~ Japanese govern-
ment and denied access to the courts during the time when the 
action should have been filed. (Accord: Scarborough, v. At. 
lantic Coast Line R. Co., 178 F.2d 253, 259, certiorari denied, 
:J39 U.S. 919 [70 S.Ct. 621, 94 L.Ed. 1343] ; Siplyak v. Davis, 
supra, 276 Pa. 49, 58; see, also, l!'arrell v. Oounty of Placer, 
~3 Ca1.2d 624, 630 (145 P.2d 570, 153 A.L.R. 323].) Clearly, 
whether a particular statute of limitation is viewed as sub· 
stantive or procedural, the consequences of a failure to com· 
mence legal proceedings within the specified time are the same 
insofar as the claimant is concerned and, accordingly, the same 
considerations that lead to the conclusion that a procedural 
statute is tolled by the fact that the claimant is denied access 
to the courts similarly lead to the conclusion that the time 
specified in a substantive statute of limitation must likewise 
be extended. 
[15] For the foregoing reasons, we have concluded that 
the trial court erroneously included the period between Sep-
tember 15, 1942, the date of distribution to the state, and 
November 30, 1944, the date of termination of German occu· 
pation of Greece, in its computation of the five-year period 
specified in section 1026. It is unnecessary to determine 
whether, as contended by petitioner, the period between the 
death of Gerasimos and the decree of distribution, or any part 
thereof, should also have been excluded. The periods between 
the death of Jecedellt, September 30, 1941, and the decree of 
distribution, September 15, 1942, and between the date that 
occupation ended, November :JO, 1944, and the date that the 
claim was filed, August 25, 1947, total less than five years. 
[16] When the operation of a statute of limitation is sus-
pended for a given length of time, the effect is to add an 
e4lLai period to the statutory period (Graybar Electric 00. v. 
iJov'inger, 81 Cal.App.2d 936, 938 [185 P.2d 370]), and, 
under the views expressed herein, petitioner thus filed a claim 
within the five-year period prescribed by section 1026. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
.T., and Spence, .T., concurred. 
